2. Prepare to wait in line. Maybe you’ll be lucky but it’s best to come prepared. Bring an umbrella, water or Gatorade and a book to read.

3. Bring your sample ballot or your voting “kodigo.” Each voter will get only ONE ballot. You won’t get a second chance if you make a mistake in shading the bilog na hugis itlog. Read the names of candidates very carefully before shading anything. Be sure not to over vote!

4. You will find “poll watchers” from various political parties distributing “sample ballots.” In my village alone, Nacionalista Party and Liberal Party volunteers were distributing sample ballots with pre-shaded circles of candidates. Do not accept anything from them! I took one sheet of paper earlier thinking it was an empty sample ballot but when I saw that it was shaded, I ripped it up on the spot! I complained about them to the police but they didn’t do anything. >_< Sabi ng pulis okay lang daw, even after I said that the campaign period ended last Saturday and the sample ballots were campaign materials because they said, "Ito ang iboto sa May 10." Then they ignored me. Whatever. Fools.

And note, the Liberal Party campaign table was right beside the police desk and in direct view of the soldier who was supposed to guard the poll.

5. Senior citizens and pregnant women are prioritized. If you're with either type, be vigilant. The poll volunteer should call out for senior citizens every now and then.

6. When you receive your ballot, be sure to check each category on the front and back pages. Make sure that your ballot is clean. Earlier, it was reported that a voter had received a ballot where the Congressman slot was shaded. (The name of Congressman whose bilog na hugis itlog was shaded was Mat Defensor.) If you see any markings or scratches on the ballot, go to the BEI right away. For some reason, the voter who received the curious ballot with Defensor's name shaded in only complained after she fed the ballot into the PCOS machine. O_o

7. Use the marker provided by the poll volunteer. Do not use other markers! And yes, the ink bleeds onto the back page. I hope this doesn't cause any problems.

8. Do not make any unnecessary marks. Avoid folding or crumpling the ballot.

9. After voting, feed the ballot to the PCOS machine. WAIT for the screen to flash "Congratulations! Your vote has been counted" along with the number of votes that have been counted, before you get your finger wet with indelible ink.

Good luck and stay safe! And vote wisely, citizen.

Last 15 February 2010, I attended the public graduation ceremony of the Asian Institute of Management’s Bridging Leadership Fellows – government and civil society leaders from Mindanao who partnered with AIM to develop their leadership capital, gain knowledge and skills, and cultivate prospects to encourage resource providers to support their projects and programs.

These men and women were introduced to the Bridging Leadership Framework, a framework that emphasizes dialogue and resource-sharing among multiple stakeholders, instead of letting the responsibility for social change fall squarely on the hands of a single person or group. Vital to this framework’s success is the cultivation of mutual trust, even between conflicting parties.

Since it was a graduation ceremony, I expected the leaders to present success stories depicting the effectiveness of the Bridging Leadership framework. I was particulary excited to listen to the military leaders: Brigadier-General Rustico “Rusty” Guerrero, Lieutenant-Colonel Gavin Edjawan, and their mentors, Bridging Leadership alumni Lieutenant-General Benjamin Dolorfino and Lieutenant-General Raymundo Ferrer. Soldiers are often perceived negatively due to cases of corruption and human rights violations, the widespread perception that they are corrupt and cruel, and the lingering trauma from Martial Law abuses. How then did they apply the Bridging Leadership framework during their assignments in hostile, frightened communities?

Basilan-based BGen Guerrero of the Philippine Marine Corps shared that he had experienced a change of heart. The volatile security environment in Basilan was the result of clashes between the AFP and the Abu Sayyaf, the absence of local government leaders from their very own municipalities, the surge in kidnappings and the prevalence of family feuds (rido). He realized that violence in Mindanao was a multi-dimensional problem that required multi-dimensional solutions and multi-dimensional support. He felt that instead of focusing his energy on winning battles, he should shift his attention to winning the peace. Combat missions should be intelligence-driven, with the goal of avoiding collateral damage and the displacement of civilians.

He recognized that aside from the military and the police, other key groups had a major stake in the developments in Basilan. Under the mentorship of LtGen Dolorfino, he engaged in consultation with the local government, NGOs, civil society and religious leaders. With the blessing of Mayor Istarul of Tipo-Tipo in Basilan, his Marines helped renovate and construct school buildings. Some of his Marines were deployed as teachers in the alternative literacy system for parents. Barangay roads resembling Ondoy-ravaged streets kept children away from schools, and the Philippine Army engineers made them safer from travel. A manual was developed to train military officers how to manage clan conflicts. Other programs included health missions, lectures on Muslim culture for the Marines, and Bridging Leadership training for small unit commanders so that the Marines would become more aware of the importance of coordinating with multiple stakeholders.

According to Cecille Lao’s write-up of his case, one key ingredient in his success was not tolerating soldiers’ unprofessional behavior toward the civilians. He punished Marines who made mistakes and commended those who conducted themselves properly.

Meanwhile, LTC Edjawan of the Army Infantry was introduced to multi-stakeholder cooperation through a delicate challenge that resulted in criticism from other senior officers and eventually his relief from his post as Battalion Commander of the 51st Infantry Battalion. Five of his soldiers were kidnapped by the MILF. Faced with the options of attacking the MILF or negotiating for his men’s release, he opted to negotiate. That same day, all five soldiers were released. According to Czarina Medina’s write-up of his case, the successful negotiation gained the MILF’s respect but did not sit well with his superiors. He was eventually relieved from his post and reassigned to Zamboanga, and eventually Maguindanao.

In Maguindanao, he assigned the soldiers to undergo a 45-day immersion program with the Muslim barangays so they could get to know and trust the community, and so that the community could get to know and trust them in return. He helped set up community centers for peace and development to link the local government units with NGOs. Together with stakeholders, he was able to get funds for water well and road construction and other infrastructure and health projects. The people’s affection for the unit was so high that the community joked that they would form barricades to prevent the soldiers from leaving their place.

Later, Marine LtGen Benjamin Muhammed Dolorfino of the Western Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM) and Army LtGen Raymundo Ferrer of the Eastern Mindanao Command (EASTMINCOM) spoke about their experiences working for peace in Mindanao. Both were recently awarded the Peace Award by the Board of the Ateneo de Zamboanga University, as a statement of support for generals who worked for peace in Mindanao.

What struck me about these officers was their willingness to discuss the times when military operations led to problems in the community. “Sometimes, the military can be part of the problem,” said General Dolorfino, “causing displacement and collateral damage.” General Ferrer admitted that he had progressed from being “utak-pulbura” to an “enlightened warrior.” They shared that while the importance of human rights had been duly impressed upon the military, there was still a need to train soldiers how to apply human rights considerations in practical situations. Furthermore, like the two officers who spoke before them, the two generals asserted that the military’s success parameters had to change. Instead of relying on Vietnam-era success indicators such as the number of enemy corpses, it seemed that a minimal body count and improved conditions in the community were better determinants of an officer’s leadership ability.

These gentlemen were not the only ones in that room who experienced a change of heart. Listening to them made me question my own ideas about civil-military operations. Not too long ago, I thought that CMO was mostly a PR effort intended to boost the military’s popularity by having them dole out medical supplies and goods—a program that could not be sustained after the unit left or after the mission changed. But after hearing the officers’ reports, I saw that CMO was turning out to be heart of the strategy, not just part of the strategy to achieve lasting peace and order. Without a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship between the community and the military, the military would be unable to distinguish their true opponents from those who were merely unhappy with their situation or those who were afraid of the military because of negative previous encounters with them. Without the community’s support, the military’s morale would crumble. Without the military’s support, the community would be unprotected against lawless elements. Furthermore, they would miss out on a crucial source of manpower for development projects that could make a lasting impact on the lives of the citizens.

When soldiers get deployed to remote, impoverished communities, they see that the absence of competent leadership has led to worsening poverty, poorer health, environmental degradation, the loss of limited resources, and increases in conflict. Soldiers I’ve interviewed for my previous research have said that the lack of government services in conflict-ridden areas is what leads to violence. They lamented that the military was often the only government presence felt by the communities they were assigned to.

The officers who spoke that day rose to the challenge of being the only government presence in the communities they were assigned to. They transformed the situation into an opportunity to show the communities that they were indeed soldiers of the people, ready and determined to respond to their needs. They started out not knowing much about the local culture, so they filled the gaps in knowledge by interacting with the people, getting to know the people’s lifestyle, and connecting with the local power brokers. They found ways to learn the organizing skills they lacked, and they helped the communities by sharing their own skills, knowledge and resources that the communities lacked. They worked with the other stakeholders to produce results that none of them could have accomplished by working alone.

Such was the effect of CMO on the communities. But according to BGen Guerrero, CMO had another important effect on the morale of the troops. Instead of having to deal with the frustration of being feared and detested by the civilians, they showed that they could use their strength, mobility and discipline to fix roads, build school buildings, set up water infrastructure, teach, and do other civic action projects. Patience and persistence eventually won the communities’ respect and affection, which in turn made the soldiers feel appreciated by the people they risked their lives for.

The soldiers involved in these programs transcended the limitations set by the traditional duties of the military. They were trained to win battles using firepower but, upon realizing that building trust and demonstrating competence were far more effective weapons, they set aside their old perceptions and strove to genuinely listen to the people they had sworn to protect. The guns the soldiers possessed gave them the mantle of institutional authority that can all too easily be abused, but they chose to share the power with the different stakeholders from the community, using their guns only to ward off those who wanted to take advantage of the community’s vulnerabilities.

What struck me the most was the officers’ willingness to admit that elements of the military had exacerbated the problems, and that much had yet to be improved. It takes great courage and humility for anyone to admit that his/her organization has to change, especially if that organization is as closely guarded and traditional as the military. Hearing these officers admit to the public that they needed to undergo a change of heart gave me a sense of hope that the military is capable of taking a long, hard look at itself and confronting ideas and practices that prevent it from accomplishing its mandate of protecting the people.

When A Change of Heart Led to Better Lives: A Look at Civil-Military Operations in Mindanao by Angela B Serrano is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 Philippines License.